Abstract-There is limited formal mathematical analysis of one type of games -dynamic sequential games with large, or even infinitely large, planning horizons, from the point view of system controls. In this paper, we consider a class of noncooperative Dynamic Linear Quadratic Sequential Games (LQSGs). For LQSGs with finite planning horizons, we provide state feedback Nash strategies, and their existence and uniqueness within the class of state feedback strategies are proved. When the planning horizon approaches infinity, we prove that the feedback systems with the state feedback Nash strategies are uniformly asymptotically stable, given that the associated coupled Riccati equations have a positive definite solution. Finally we show that at least one positive definite solution for the coupled Riccati equations of a scalar LQSG exists.
I. INTRODUCTION
A sequential game is one in which players apply their strategies following a certain predefined order, and in which at least some players can observe the moves of other players who make decisions preceding them. The sequential game is a natural framework to address some real problems, such as the "Action-Reaction-Counteraction" paradigm used in military intelligence and advertising campaigns strategies of several competing firms in economics.
A sequential game was first introduced and researched by White in [1] , but the results were based on an approximate ε-equilibria. Then in 1982, Kreps and Wilson [2] introduced a new criterion of "sequential equilibrium" for sequential games. Six years later, Breton, Alj and Haurie proposed a leader-follower one, "sequential Stackelberg Equilibria" in [3] . Sequential games can be represented by game trees (the extensive form of games) and solved using the concept of rollback, or sub-game perfect equilibrium, which was proposed by Selten [4] .
These current tools lack the sophistication to study games in which the players have relatively large, or even infinitely large, planning horizons. In this paper, we develop a technique for sequential games in the context of linear-quadratic formulations with perfect information structure. Although linear-quadratic games have been studied extensively by Başar and Olsder in [5] , the combination of dynamic programming and linear-quadratic sequential games is seldom touched.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we derive state feedback Nash strategies for Liner Quadratic Sequential Games (LQSGs) with finite planning horizons. We show that the existence of unique state feedback Nash strategies is guaranteed. Then, in Section III, we prove that the infinite-horizon non-cooperative dynamic LQSG sequentially switched systems with our state feedback Nash Strategies are uniformly asymptotically stable with the assumption that the associated coupled Riccati equations have a positive definite solution. In Section IV, we prove the existence of solutions to the coupled Riccati equations for the scalar cases. Numerical systems are simulated in Section V to illustrate the asymptotical stability of the system with state feedback Nash strategies. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. DYNAMIC NONCOOPERATIVE LINEAR QUADRATIC SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH FINITE PLANNING HORIZONS
In this section, we consider Nash Strategies for Noncooperative Dynamic LQSGs. Dynamic Programming is used to deduce Nash strategies for the 2-player finite games.
Consider the LQSG with 2 players of the form
with the constraints
where,
The cost functions of the players are defined by
where all matrices are symmetric with Q i k ≥ 0 and R ij k > 0 for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, and k = 0, 1, · · · , N .
The Nash strategy was proposed originally by Nash in [6] . For the sequential game defined above, π * = {(u 1 * k , u 2 * k+1 )| k is odd, and k ≤ N − 1} is a Nash equilibrium (here assume the player 1 and player 2 will apply their controllers at odd-valued and even-valued time index, respectively), if for every strategy
)| k is odd, and k ≤ N − 1}. For simplicity of notations, we denote the following two conditions as
and
where K 
with boundary conditions
and k = 0, 1, · · · , N , by induction, we can prove Lemma 1.
For the system defined in (1) -(4) with perfect information structure, the unique Nash state feedback strategies are given by
where L 1 k and L 2 k are defined, respectively, in (5) and (6) .
The gradient of
, we obtain the Nash strategies
Similarly, we get γ
By induction, we proved the theorem. Remark 1: By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the control strategies given by (9)-(10) is a valid Nash state feedback strategy for the Noncooperative Finite Sequential Game defined in (1)-(4).
III. NONCOOPERATIVE INFINITE-HORIZON LINEAR QUADRATIC SEQUENTIAL GAMES: SEQUENTIALLY SWITCHED SYSTEMS
For the LQSG defined in (1)- (4), when N → +∞, it becomes an Infinite-Horizon LQSG problem. If matrices
k , and R ij k are constant, the InfiniteHorizon Sequential game is a sequentially switched system, which is a special case of the switched system in [7] , [8] . Let us examine the 2-player cases defined as
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where all matrices are symmetric with
, and R ij > 0 for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. 
Proof: Using the conclusion and the same proof method of Theorem 1, we obtain the Nash strategies by taking the limits of the Nash solutions for the finite planning horizon cases as N → ∞.
Remark 2: From the conditions of Theorem 2, we obtain the coupled Discrete-time Algebraic Riccati Equations (DAREs) associated with sequential games
where [5] (pp. 295-297). In this paper, we do not have the existence conditions for sequential games either. We may attempt to obtain solutions by taking limits on K i k defined in (7) and (8), provided the limits exist. It is possible that there are other solutions, which also provide Nash strategies.
Remark 3: The condition in Theorem 2 is equivalent to that the associated coupled Riccati equations admit a positive definite solution. Since in the infinite-horizon case (N → ∞), we know that x N = 0 due to the state feedback formulation. So we can choose arbitrary Q 
where
which is also positive definite. Next, we will prove
Since R 11 > 0, R 21 > 0 and Q i ≥ 0, we can obtain V k+1 (x k+1 ) − V k (x k ) ≤ 0, which implies the uniform stability of the zero equilibrium.
Finally, an additional argument is needed to establish asymptotic stability. Since (A, C 1 ) and (A, C 2 ) are observable (where
So the system is uniformly asymptotically stable.
Remark 4: Using a similar notation in Section II, we can extend the results here to the M -player cases.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COUPLED RICCATI EQUATIONS IN THE SCALAR LQSG CASES
It is well known that there are no general results ensuring the existence of the solutions to the coupled Riccati equations in simultaneous closed loop Nash games. However, for a scalar case, we will show that a positive definite solution is guaranteed for the scalar LQSGs.
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ThC05.5 Theorem 4: For the scalar case of Linear Quadratic Sequential Game defined as
where q i ≥ 0 and r ij > 0 for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, (a, b 1 ) and (a, b 2 ) are stabilizable. (a, q 1 ) and (a, q 2 ) are detectable, we can always find a positive solution to the related coupled Riccati Equations.
Since 
Since
we have
(31)
Denote K e := K 1 e and K o := K 2 o . Simplifying (31) and (32), we get
By applying (34) and (35) to (30) and (33), respectively, we obtain
Since (a, q 1 ) and (a, q 2 ) are detectable, q 1 > 0 and q 2 > 0. Then for any non-negative K e and K o , A e > 0, A o > 0, C e > 0 and C o > 0. For equations (36) and (37), we have
So, the roots of (36) and (37) are real-valued,
From (44) and (45), we know √ ∆ e > |B e | and √ ∆ o > |B o |. So we can always find the positive valued roots of (36) and (37):
Remark 5: Only non-negative K o and K e are evaluated in function f e and f o , respectively.
Next, we will show that ∃w e > 0, such thatw e ≥ K e > 0 for any
where β i and α i are constants which depend on a, b i , r ij and q i . Since K o ∈ [0, +∞) and r 22 > 0,K o ≥ r 22 > 0. Then
(51) So, function f e (K o ) is bounded from above byw e , and from below by 0. Similarly, we can findw o > 0, such that
for any K e ∈ [0, +∞).
From (51) and (52), we conclude that there is at least one positive pair (K e , K o ) which satisfies equations (36) and (37). We denote a pair as (P 
Since (a, q 1 ) and (a, q 2 ) are detectable, q 1 > 0 and
is a positive solution to the related coupled Riccati Equations, which completes our proof.
Remark 6: From Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we can always find state feedback Nash Strategies for scalar LQSGs such that the overall systems are uniformly asymptotically stable.
V. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
Numerical examples are given in this section to illustrate our Nash Strategy of LQSG switched systems.
A. Stable 2-order System
Consider the system defined in (16) -(19) with
We can calculate K The simulation results are shown in Fig.1, Fig.2 and Fig.3 . The feedback system with Nash Strategy is asymptotically stable.
B. Scalar Case
The following scalar numerical example will be used to illustrate the conclusion stated in Remark 6. The scalar system has a = 0.3, b 1 = 2.3, b 2 = 0.5, q 1 = 1.5, q 2 = 0.6, r 11 = 4.4, r 12 = 4.7, r 21 = 0.1 and r 22 = 0.5. As shown in Fig 7, 8 and 9 , at least one positive solution exist for the associated couple Riccati equations. The closed-loop system with our state feedback Nash Strategies is stable, as shown in Fig. 10 . 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a mathematical analysis of linear quadratic sequential games (LQSGs) is presented. A state feedback Nash strategy of the LQSGs was provided by using Dynamic Programming. Finite and infinite time horizon cases were considered. For infinite-horizon sequentially switched systems, we proved uniform asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium using the Lyapunov's method, under the assumption that the discrete algebraic Riccati equations have a positive definite solution. This is similar to the assumptions in the simultaneous game case. For scalar cases, we showed that a positive definite solution to the associated coupled Riccati equations is guaranteed for the stabilizable and detectable cases. 
